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Previous studies of transport tax reform have typically assumed that the reform itself does not 
affect the marginal value of time. In this paper we consider a model of urban transport with 
two trip purposes, commuting and non-commuting, to analyse the effects of transport tax 
reform on the value of time and marginal external congestion costs. The theoretical results 
suggest that the assumption of multiple trip purposes implies that these effects are non-trivial. 
Consequently, assuming exogenous time values may lead to inaccurate estimates of optimal 
congestion taxes and of the welfare effects of transport tax reform. Empirical work using 
Belgian data illustrates the potentially large effect of transport tax reform on time values. In 
fact, the majority of the tax reform exercises studied reduce traffic levels but raise time values 
and marginal external congestion costs.  
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Widespread concern about the external costs associated with increasing transport 
demand has generated a large literature on optimal externality taxes and optimal tax 
reform in the transport sector. Examples include Keeler and Small (1977), Glaister 
and Lewis (1978), Small (1983), Viton (1983), Kraus (1989), Arnott, De Palma, and 
Lindsey (1993), De Borger et al. (1997),  Proost and Van Dender (2001), and Small 
and Yan  (2001).  These models implicitly or explicitly assume that the value of time 
is unaffected by the proposed policy changes. Also, although some studies take 
account of different transport markets (according to mode, time of day, car type, etc.), 
they do not distinguish between trip purposes such as commuting and non-
commuting. The few models that do allow for endogenous values of time (Mayeres 
and Proost (1997), where the endogeneity is explicit, and Parry and Bento (2001), 
where it is implicit) are based on a single trip purpose.  This paper aims to show that 
explicitly distinguishing between trip purposes implies that transport policies may 
have non-negligible effects on the value of time. As a consequence, realising that in 
most countries commuting is indeed an important trip purpose during peak hours, the 
welfare effects suggested by models assuming either constant values of time or single 
trip purposes may be inaccurate.     
Since the seminal papers by Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977), economists 
have devoted serious attention to the determinants of the value of time (for a recent 
survey, see Jara-Diaz, 2000). Theoretical research and empirical analysis of large-
scale surveys suggest that the value consumers place on time savings not only 
depends on income or wage levels, but also on many socio-economic characteristics. 
Relevant references include Clifford and Whinston (1998), Ramjerdi, Rand and 
Saelensminde (1997) and de Jong and Gunn (2001). Moreover, time values vary  
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according to the specific circumstances under which the time saved is actually spent 
(see, e.g., De Donnea, 1972, Hague Consulting Group, 1990, de Jong and Gunn, 
2001). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the potential dependency of the value of time 
on the level of transport prices has received little attention. It has not explicitly been 
analysed how a tax reform itself affects the values of time, marginal congestion costs 
and the welfare effects of the reform. Using endogenous values of time is especially 
relevant in optimal tax models and in tax reform exercises in the transport sector, 
where the prevalence of congestion externalities may require large price adjustments, 
and where the road is simultaneously used for several trip purposes that differ in their 
complementarity to leisure.  
Using a simple model with two trip purposes, this paper finds that transport 
taxes may substantially affect the value of time. In particular, policies that combine 
transport tax increases with adjustments in labour taxes to reduce the distortions from 
the tax system (see, e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996) are likely to increase the 
marginal value of time.  The size of the effect depends on the share of commuting 
trips in overall traffic and on the price sensitivity of transport demand. With 
endogenous time values, a joint tax reform on the transport and labour markets may 
yield lower traffic levels, less congestion, but higher marginal external congestion 
costs. This contrasts with the popular view that directly associates decreases in traffic 
levels on a congestible facility with reductions in marginal external congestion costs. 
The above findings imply that models with constant time values and models 
that inappropriately ignore multiple trip purposes, produce inaccurate results. If 
commuting trips are a non-negligible share of traffic and a model with one trip 
purpose and an exogenously fixed values of time is used, the time values and  
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marginal external congestion costs at the post-reform equilibrium are underestimated, 
while the welfare effects are overestimated.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the value of time and 
marginal external congestion costs in a stylised model of consumer choice with two 
trip purposes. Section 3 illustrates the interactions using a more elaborate numerical 
model, with two transport modes and two trip purposes, calibrated on stylised Belgian 
data. The effects of optimal taxes and of various types of tax reform are considered. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Transport taxes, the value of time and marginal external congestion costs 
in a model with two trip purposes  
 
We present the theoretical model and then study the impact of transport and labour tax 
reforms on the marginal value of time and on marginal external congestion costs. 
 
2.1  A simple model with two trip purposes 
 
Let a representative consumer care about two types of trips, a general consumption 
good, and leisure. Preferences are given by  012 (,,,) uq q q N, where q0 is a composite 
commodity with price normalised at one,  1 q  are non-commuting trips,  2 q  are 
commuting trips (the journey-to-work), and N is leisure time. The model focuses 
exclusively on peak period travel, when congestion is worst and both trip purposes are 
relevant (LRC, 1994, US Federal Highway Administration, 1995). To make the 
distinction between the two trip motives as transparent as possible, commuting is  
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assumed to be directly proportional to labour supply L, i.e.  2 qL = . This says that 
each day of work requires one morning peak trip, assumed for simplicity to be one 
kilometre long.  Labour supply is elastic in terms of the number or days of labour, but 
the length of each workday is fixed. 
There is only one transport mode (and only one car type). Transport prices per 
trip (or per kilometre) are  1 p  and  2 p  for non-commuting and commuting, 
respectively. The prices are different if, e.g., commuting expenses are tax deductible 
(cf. Wrede, 2001). In the absence of tax deductibility both prices are identical. 
Commuting and non-commuting transport share a congestible road network, and 
therefore jointly determine travel time  () aa F = , where a(.) is the congestion 
function, 12 () Fn qq =+ , and n is the number of consumers. We normalise n=1 
throughout.  
The consumer maximises utility subject to a budget and a time constraint: 
() [ ] 01 12 21   L qp qp q t L S λ ++ = −+      (1) 
[ ] 12 ( ( ))( )                NL a Fqq L γ ++ + =      (2) 
where  L t  is the labour tax rate (wages are normalised to 1 without loss of generality), 
L is labour time, S is a fixed lump sum transfer, and L  is the time endowment. 
Finally, λ  and γ  are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget and time constraints.   
Using  2 qL =  and assuming that the representative consumer neglects his own 
impact on congestion, we obtain the first-order conditions (3), where subscripts 
indicate partial derivatives 
0
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The marginal utility of non-commuting trips is positive. However, the marginal utility 
of commuting trips, which can also be interpreted as the net marginal utility of time 
spent working, may take either sign.  Following Jara-Diaz (2000) we define the 
marginal value of time by 
0
N u MVOT u ≡ . Using the system of first-order conditions 

















      ( 4 )  
The marginal value of time, which at the optimum is independent of the activity in 
which it is spent, equals the net real wage per unit of time, corrected for the marginal 
(dis-)utility of commuting.
1  The net real wage captures the cost of commuting and 
the time input per hour of work includes commuting time.  
Although we study the issue more formally below, the potential impact of 
transport pricing reform on the value of time in this model can be seen from (4). The 
value of time directly depends on congestion and on commuting costs. Since reducing 
congestion is often a major reason for transport tax reform, and since large transport 
tax changes are required to cope with external congestion costs, the impact of price 
changes for non-commuting transport on the value of time through changes in 
congestion can be large. A commuting tax has an additional direct effect on time 
values through the net real wage. Finally note that, since transport prices are also 
likely to affect labour supply and commuting, the marginal utility of income and of 
commuting cannot be assumed to be constant.  
                                                 
1 Slightly different expressions for the value of time are obtained depending on the exact specification 
of the utility function (e.g., explicitly including travel time or labour supply as an extra argument of 
utility). See Jara-Diaz (2000) for an overview. The main point of this paper, viz. that distinguishing trip 
purposes has implications for the impact of tax changes on the value of time, is not affected.   
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Observe that the impact of transport prices on time values is explicitly due to 
the assumption of two trip purposes, one of which is commuting. If all transport were 
aggregated and treated as non-commuting transport (i.e. assuming  2 0 q =  and 
ignoring  2 qL = ), then the model implies a value of time equal to the net wage, 
1 L MVOT t γ
λ ≡= − . In that case equilibrium transport prices do not affect values of 
time, and the labour tax reduces the time value on a one-to-one basis. 
  
2. 2  Taxes and the value of time with multiple trip purposes 
 
We now consider more formally the impact of price and tax changes on the value of 
time. To simplify the analysis we impose some extra structure on preferences.
2  An 
outline of the analysis for the general case is relegated to Appendix 1.  Specifically, 
assume that utility is quasi-linear in the numeraire good and that commuting is 
additively separable from other consumption goods and leisure:   
012 0 1 2 (,,,) (,) () uq q q N q Uq N gq =+ +  
These assumptions imply that the marginal utility of income is constant and equal to 
one ( 0 1 u λ == ) so that 
0
N u MVOT u γ ≡= .  Substituting  0 q  from the budget 
constraint into the utility function and using  1 λ = , the system of first-order conditions 
now reads: 
                                                 
2 In general, the results depend on all second derivatives of the utility function. This obscures the 
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       ( 5 )  
where the final equation is the time restriction.  
The consumer’s optimisation problem implies that system (5) holds at given 
prices, taxes and an exogenous congestion level a=a(F). However, we are interested 
in the impact of taxes on demand and on the value of time γ , taking into account the 
effect of taxes and prices on congestion levels. Differentiating (5), capturing price 
effects on a via demand changes, and using matrix notation yields: 




'' 0 ( 1 )
01 0




ua a u ad q d p
a u a a dq dt dp
uu d N




−− −     
     −−− + +      =
     −
     −+ − ++ −     
   (6) 
where, as before,  12 Fqq =+ is total transport demand and  () ' da F a dF = is the slope 
of the congestion function. 
The solutions for  12 ,,, dq dq dN dγ  can be obtained by Cramer’s rule.  Here we 
only report the impact of transport prices and labour taxes on the value of time γ  (see 
Appendix 2 for more details on the effects of price and tax changes on transport and 
leisure demand). We find:  
[] {} 22 1 1
1
1
() ' ' ( ) NN N NN N NN
d
ua u u a F u a uu
dp
γ
γ =− + + +
∆






() ( 1 ' ) ' ( ) NN N NN N
L
dd
uu u aa F a u u
dt dp
γγ
γ == − + + − +
∆
   (8) 
where  ∆ is the determinant associated with the system in (6). In Appendix 2 it is 
shown that a mild restriction on the feedback effects of congestion on demand  
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guarantees that it is negative. We assume this condition to hold and we assume 
throughout that marginal utility is non-increasing, i.e.,  0 NN u ≤ ,  11 0 u ≤  and  22 0 u ≤ .  
Consider the impact of the price of non-commuting trips on the value of time 
(see (7)). In view of (4) it is not surprising that its sign strongly depends on how the 
price change affects commuting and overall congestion. To see this, first suppose that 
the marginal utility of commuting were constant, so that  22 0 u = . An increase in the 
price of non-commuting will then raise or reduce the value of time, depending on the 
sign of  1NN N uu + . As seen in appendix 2,  1 0 NN N uu +<  is a sufficient condition for 
more expensive non-commuting transport to reduce overall congestion. If this 
condition holds, the price increase raises the value of time. It would decline if the 
price increase actually caused congestion to rise, i.e. if the negative price effect on 
non-commuting demand were more than compensated by a large positive cross-price 
effect on labour supply and commuting demand. Next, if  22 0 u < , the above 
statements must be amended depending on the change in commuting transport.   
Noting from appendix 2 that ( 1 NN N au u − )<0 is a sufficient condition for  2
1
0 dq
dp > , 
it is clear that a strong positive cross-price effect reduces the value of time.  
An increase in the labour tax and in the price of commuting have the same 
impact on the value of time because they affect the net real wage identically.
3 Since 
2
11 1 0 NN N uu u −>  by the strict concavity of U(.), both will reduce the value of time as 
long as  1N u  is not too positive, see (8). This is plausible: higher labour taxes reduce 
the value of time unless commuting demand and total congestion drastically decline. 
                                                 
3   This is no longer true in the empirical model, where two transport modes are considered.  
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As seen in Appendix 2, a very large positive  1N u  indeed implies strong reductions in 
commuting and labour supply; as a consequence, congestion declines while the 
marginal utility of commuting rises. Both effects raise the value of time.  
In sum, the above discussion implies that under many circumstances raising 
the price of non-commuting transport will raise time values, whereas commuting or 
labour taxes are likely to reduce time values. According to (7), as long as an increase 
in 1 p  reduces overall congestion and does not substantially raise labour supply, the 
impact on the value of time is positive. The larger the impact on labour supply, the 
smaller the effect on the value of time and the larger the likelihood that the value of 
time will actually decline. As suggested by (8), we expect labour or commuting taxes 
to reduce the value of time unless labour supply decreases substantially. 




γ  remain unaffected if we assume that commuting and 
non-commuting transport prices cannot be differentiated, either for technical reasons 
or because of political constraints. However, since the common transport price 
directly affects the net real wage, the impact of a higher transport price (p=p1=p2) on 
time values does change. Specifically, we find:  
{ }
2
22 11 1 1 22
1
() ( 1 ' ) ( ) NN N N NN
d
uu u u a a F u uu
dp
γ  =+ − + + − +  ∆
  
As the term between square brackets is positive, for a constant marginal utility of 
commuting ( 22 u =0) a price increase now reduces the value of time, contrary to the 
outcome with price differentiation. Even though the price increase reduces congestion 
(raising time values), this is more than compensated by the direct reduction in the real 
net wage. If  22 u <0, the negative effect is counteracted by a positive effect that is 
larger for a larger reduction in commuting demand. The ultimate sign is 
indeterminate. Note also that we expect the price effect on the value of time to be  
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smaller here than the price effect for non-commuting transport in the tax 
differentiation case.  
Table 1 summarises the most relevant findings and compares them with the 
case of a single trip purpose (in which case  1 L MVOT t =− ; column 2) and with the 
case of two trip purposes with fixed labour supply (last column). In the latter case, 
labour or commuting taxes do not affect the value of time, as the quasi-linear utility 
structure implies that these taxes have no effect on any of the time-using commodities 
(transport, leisure). Only non-commuting transport prices affect the value of time. 
Although the sign of the effect is ambiguous, it is plausibly negative, because a 
transport price increase reduces the total time input associated with non-commuting.  
 
Table 1 Plausible impact of prices and taxes on the marginal value of time 
 Model  type 
Impact of increasing:  Two trip 
purposes 
One trip purpose 
(non-commuting) 
Two trip purposes and 
fixed labour supply 
    Labour tax  L t   <0 -1  0 
    Non-commuting transport price  1 p   >0 0  <0   
    Commuting transport price  2 p   <0 Not  relevant  0 
    Common transport price 
    12 p pp == 
<0 or >0  Not relevant  <0  
 
 
2.3  Taxes and marginal external costs with endogenous time values 
 
In this model, marginal external congestion costs MECC are the same for commuting 
and non-commuting. Driving one extra kilometre raises F, reduces travel speed and 
increases travel time per kilometre a(F). The time losses apply to all kilometres driven 
and are evaluated at the value of time per time unit. So we can write:  
12 ( )*( ')*( ) MECC MVOT a q q =+      (9)  
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where  () ' da F a dF = . Taxes and transport prices affect congestion costs through 
traffic flows, the slope of the congestion function, and the value of time.   
Differentiating (9) and rearranging, we obtain the following expressions:   
[]
12 () '
(* ) ' ( ' ) *
LL L
dM E C C d a d q d q d M V O T
MVOT F a a F
dt dF dt dt
    +  =+ +          
           (10) 
[]
12 () '
(* ) ' ( ' ) *
ii i
dM E C C d a d q d q d M V O T
MVOT F a a F
dp dF dp dp
    +  =+ +          
           (11) 
where i=1,2. The first term on the right-hand-side of (10)-(11) measures the impact of 
the tax or price change via its effect on the traffic flow F. At constant values of time, 
the change in traffic flow influences the number of users affected by a marginal traffic 
increase, and it affects the slope of the congestion function. Since both effects are 
plausibly positive, the first term indicates that a price or tax increase reduces marginal 
external congestion costs as long as it reduces congestion. The second term is the 
impact of tax changes on the marginal congestion cost via their effect on the value of 
time. These effects where derived before for a simplified setting.  
It is clear, then, that ignoring changes in time values introduces errors in 
determining marginal external costs. For example, suppose an increase in the price of 
non-commuting transport reduces congestion and raises the value of time. Assuming 
exogenous values of time then leads to overestimating the reduction in MECC. 
Analogously, if an increase in the commuting tax reduces congestion but reduces the 
value of time then the reduction in MECC will be underestimated if exogenous time 
values are assumed. Note that if the value of time substantially rises, marginal 
congestion costs may actually increase despite the reduction in congestion brought 
about by the price increase. For the same reason it is conceivable that a joint  
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transport-labour tax reform increases MECC even when traffic flow declines, due to 
its positive impact on the value of time.  
Three implications of the above discussion are worth repeating. First, 
exogenous time values will lead to inaccurate assessments of the welfare effects of 
transport tax reforms and of optimal congestion taxes, when a nontrivial fraction of 
transport flows refer to commuting. A model that implicitly treats all transport as non-
commuting and that imposes constant time values, is likely to overestimate the 
reduction in the MECC as well as the welfare effects. For the same reason, optimal 
taxation exercises focusing on the transport market but using exogenous time values 
are likely to underestimate optimal congestion taxes. Second, even with endogenous 
values of time, we expect combined transport and labour tax reforms to lead to quite 
different implications in models with multiple trip purposes as compared to models 
that treat all transport as non-commuting. Suppose a transport tax reform is 
accompanied by measures to reduce the distortion on the labour market (raising 
transport taxes rise but reducing labour taxes). In models with a single trip purpose 
this reform will raise time values. This plausibly also is the case higher non-
commuting transport prices, in a model with two trip purposes. However, to the extent 
that the combined change in commuting and labour taxes ultimately reduces the net 
real wage (i.e., the commuting tax is not fully compensated by the labour tax 
reduction), this second effect counteracts the first and reduces the value of time. The 
impact on marginal congestion costs will therefore be dampened.  Third, larger shifts 
in time values and external costs are expected if tax reforms allow differentiation 
between non-commuting and commuting taxes.  
Although generalising these findings is difficult because of the simplicity of 
the model, there is no reason to expect that the interactions will disappear in more  
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general models as they essentially follow from distinguishing several trip purposes. 
Whether the issue is empirically sufficiently important to be worried about is 
something to be found out, and this is the purpose of the numerical exercise in the 
next section. 
  
3.  A numerical application 
 
We illustrate some of the theoretical results using a numerical model with two trip 
purposes and endogenous time values (see Van Dender, 2001, for an elaborate 
description). The model is calibrated using data representing peak period traffic flows 
and congestion for an average workday in a typical Belgian mid-size city. 
 
3.1  Overview of the model 
 
The applied model generalises the theoretical analysis in two respects. First, instead of 
a quasi-linear utility function, a nested-CES representation of preferences is used. 
Second, we allow for multi-modality by distinguishing car and bus trips. The 
separability assumption for commuting transport is retained, as in Parry and Bento 











, ( ,) , (,)
1      





Max u U q q q N g q q











   (12)  
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where q0 is the composite commodity (untaxed numeraire), q1 are non-commuting car 
trips, q2 are non-commuting bus trips, q3 is car commuting, q4 is bus commuting and 
N is leisure.  Here, a=a(F)=a(q1+q3+α(q2+q4)), as the congestion function is adjusted 
for the presence of buses. The parameter α<1 indicates that an extra bus trip per 
passenger contributes less to congestion than a car trip.
4  One simplification of the 
numerical model is that a linear congestion function is used, so that a change in the 
traffic flow does not affect its slope.
5  This allows us to focus on the effect of tax 
changes on marginal values of time and congestion levels, see (10) and (11). Finally, 
the proportionality between commuting and labour supply now implies that q3+q4=L. 
Traffic flow data and congestion technology are derived from a network model for the 
city of Namur (Cornelis and Van Dender, 2001).  The reference peak period speed is 
30km/h, half the free flow speed.  According to a national survey (Pollet, 2000) and a 
survey for Brussels (IRIS, 1993), the share of commuting in all peak hour trips is 
53%; 67% of commuting trips and 75% of non-commuting trips use the car mode.  
These shares reflect the modal split when the public transport mode is easily 




                                                 
4  Note the assumption that the bus occupancy rates are fixed, which is reasonable for peak hours. 
5 When the real congestion function is convex, using a linear approximation will overestimate the 
travel time reductions associated to decreases in traffic flow.  In order to moderate this overestimate, 
the linear approximation was made at traffic levels below the reference flows.  Newbery and Santos 
(2002) suggest that network-derived linear congestion functions perform well for an analysis of cordon 




3.2.1 The  central  scenario 
 
We report empirical results for a number of tax reform and optimal tax exercises. The 
reference equilibrium (REF), representing the initial situation in Belgium, is 
described in the left-most column of Table 2. The labour tax is 40%, and both 
commuting and non-commuting car traffic are taxed at less than marginal external 
cost: taxes amount to 4.24 Euro (per round trip) as compared with marginal external 
congestion costs (MECC) of 6.87 Euro. For public transport, note that the model 
assumes, consistent with current practice in Belgium, that bus transport is 
government-supplied and that the production costs are financed out of general public 
funds. With the reference subsidy of 2.7 Euro/trip, the consumer price amounts to 
0.53 Euro/trip.  
The calibrated marginal value of time in the reference equilibrium is 
7.67 Euro/hour, or 47% and 78% of the gross and the net hourly wage, respectively.  
The absolute and the relative levels are in line with the literature (e.g. Small, 1992). 
Other information (on traffic flows, labour supply, etc.) is presented in index or 
percentage form.   
The tax reforms are balanced-budget from the government’s perspective: the 
combinations of transport and labour tax changes leave total tax receipts unaffected. 
The lump-sum transfer remains constant. We look at the implications of balanced-
budget labour tax reductions by 1% and 5%, allowing transport taxes to be optimally 
adjusted and taking account of external congestion costs. Bus fares and car prices are 
restricted to be non-negative, implying maximal subsidies of 3.22 Euro and 8.08 Euro,  
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respectively
6. For each tax reform exercise we distinguish the cases of tax 
differentiation between commuting and non-commuting, and of uniform taxes across 
trip purposes. For all tax changes analysed, the impact on welfare is measured by the 
post-reform value of the indirect utility function of the representative consumer.  
Table 2 summarises the results. First consider scenarios A to D, which refer to 
the tax reform exercises. All experiments reported in the table lead to higher welfare 
(row (1)).  The value of time and the marginal external congestion costs increase in all 
scenarios. The increases in MECC occur despite the decrease in the aggregate peak 
period traffic flow in three out of four scenarios.
7  In other words, the tax reforms 
often reduce congestion while marginal external congestion costs increase.  
The tax adjustments and therefore the changes in the value of time strongly 
vary between scenarios. In the case of uniform taxes across trip purposes, the optimal 
response to a 1% reduction in labour tax is to increase car taxes, but to reduce bus 
prices slightly. A 5% labour tax reduction raises car prices more substantially, but it 
implies higher bus fares. As a consequence of these adjustments, labour supply rises 
slightly. Increasing non-commuting transport taxes and minor reductions in the net 
real wage lead to time values that rise rather modestly (by 1.2% and 5.3% for the 1% 
and 5% labour tax reductions, respectively).  
The corresponding outcomes are quite different when differentiated taxes are 
introduced. In those cases, all non-commuting trips become much more expensive. 
Since the labour tax reductions of 1% and 5% fall short of the optimal labour tax 
                                                 
6 This restriction becomes binding for bus fares if labour taxes are substantially above optimal levels. 
Since commuting is proportional to labour supply, the optimal transport tax reform will ‘correct’ 
excessive labour taxes by heavily subsidizing commuting transport.  
7  Only the 1% decrease in the labour tax, financed by differentiated transport tax changes, leads to an 
increase in the traffic flow. Intuitively, this is because the transport tax differentiation is too small to 
strongly influence commuting and labour supply.  
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adjustment (see below), there is strong pressure on commuting transport prices not to 
reduce the net real wage. The bus commuting fare reaches its lower limit of zero, and 
car commuting is heavily subsidized (at ca. 38% of its resource cost
8). Labour supply 
rises by some 4%. The strong increases in non-commuting transport taxes and the 
reduction in the labour tax together imply much higher values of time: they increase 
by 9.9% and 10.3%, respectively. Note that the larger effects on time values in the 
case of differentiated taxes are consistent with the theoretical discussion.    
Finally, consider the results for the optimal tax exercises. We only report 
values for differentiated taxes (see scenario E), as the welfare changes and the 
marginal values of time are not affected by the uniformity constraint.
9 The optimal 
labour tax reduction turns out to be 8%-point, reflecting the high initial labour tax. 
Optimal car commuting taxes are extremely high. All other transport taxes also rise 
relative to the reference situation, with the exception of the bus commuting tax. The 
marginal value of time is 14.3% higher than in the reference equilibrium. This is not a 
trivial change, and it is much larger than the impacts predicted by Mayeres and Proost 
(1997), where the time value is endogenous but there is only one trip purpose (so that 
time values only change due to labour tax adjustments).   
The numerical model suggests that the endogeneity of the value of time is 
important when changes in marginal external congestion costs and in welfare are 
assessed. In all scenarios but one, it affects the size and the direction of the change in 
MECC. With constant values of time, marginal external congestion costs would have 
declined substantially because of the reduction in traffic demand after the tax changes.  
                                                 
8 Calthrop (2001) and Wrede (2001) report optimal commuting subsidies of 50% and more than 100% 
of the resource cost, respectively.   
9 This is due to the direct relation between commuting and labour supply, cf. Van Dender (2001).  
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With endogeneity, marginal external congestion costs rise by up to 3%. Using fixed 
values of time hence leads to erroneous estimates of the adaptations of travel demand 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.3.2.2 Alternative  scenarios: some sensitivity results 
 
The elasticities of substitution and the reference composition of traffic in the previous 
section have been chosen in order to accord with the average urban context in 
Belgium. To provide some insight into the sensitivity of the results we report results 
from alternative scenarios. First, the effect of decreasing the share of non-commuting 
trips is considered. Second, the degree of substitutability between the composite 




Varying the importance of non-commuting trips 
 
The share of non-commuting trips in the central scenario is 47% of the total. Since the 
presence of multiple trip purposes was crucial in the theoretical analysis of Section 1, 
it is to be expected that the impact of transport tax reform on the marginal value of 
time strongly depends on the relative shares of commuting and non-commuting. The 
results in Table 3 support this claim. It gives for various shares of non-commuting 
trips the % changes in the marginal value of time, and the % change in welfare 
associated with two types of tax reforms, viz. (1) a 1% labour tax decrease with 
optimal differentiated transport taxes, and (2) optimal labour and transport taxes. 
 
 
                                                 
10 We also performed sensitivity analysis on the slope of the congestion function, the reference modal 
split, and the remaining elasticities of substitution. They were found to be less important for the 




Table 3 The dependence of changes in welfare and in the marginal value of time on the reference 
level and share of non-commuting trips, with tax differentiation between trip purposes 
1% labour tax decrease  Optimal labour tax  Share of non-
commuting trips  % MVOT change  % welfare change  % MVOT change  % welfare change 
47% (central sc.)  5.21 %  0.16 %  14.5 %  0.42 % 
31%  5.18 %  0.14 %  6.9 %  0.18 % 
18%  3.12 %  0.10 %  3.4 %  0.11 % 
0.01%  0.37 %  0.03 %  0.37 %  0.03 % 
 
The first row in Table 3 refers to the central scenario analysed before. The results 
show that as the importance of non-commuting transport decreases, the impact of tax 
adjustments on time values and the potential welfare gains decline. Reaching the 
maximal welfare gain requires smaller reductions in the labour tax rate when non-
commuting transport becomes less important, as can be seen from the difference 
between the welfare change for a 1% labour tax decrease and the optimal labour tax 
decrease. This is so because the non-commuting transport tax base becomes smaller. 
When the share of non-commuting trips is negligible (bottom row), the impact 
on time values is very small because in this case transport taxes are pure commuting 
taxes, which have the same effect on time values as labour taxes. The labour tax 
reduction and transport tax increases then hardly affect time values, and the only 
source of the (limited) welfare gain is the improvement of the modal split through 
modal tax differentiation. In the application this implies an increase in the share of car 
commuting (from about 67% to 75%) for a 1% reduction of the labour tax rate.
11  
The basic message from this experiment is that, as predicted by the theoretical 
analysis, the size of the impact of transport tax changes on the marginal value of time 
crucially depends on the presence and the quantitative importance of at least two trip 
                                                 
11 Note that this change in the modal split has limited effects on travel times, as the level of leisure 





purposes.  Also, the results clarify that there is a close connection between the size of 
the welfare gain and the size of the change in marginal values of time. 
 
Varying the elasticity of substitution between the composite commodity and leisure 
related activities  
 
In the central scenario, the elasticity of substitution at the top of the CES-utility tree 
was equal to 0.7. To test the sensitivity of the results we vary this from 0.2 to 1.2. 
Intuitively, higher values lead to larger own price elasticities for the composite 
commodity, for pure leisure, and for non-commuting transport.  Similarly, the cross-
price elasticity between the composite commodity and the aggregate of leisure and 
non-commuting transport will also rise with this elasticity of substitution  
Two findings stand out. First, a higher elasticity of substitution implies much 
higher increases in the value of time and higher welfare gains from transport tax 
reform. For the lowest value of the elasticity of substitution, the increase in the 
marginal value of time after implementation of the optimal policy is less than 1%, 
while for the highest value it is 26%. Similarly, if substitution possibilities between 
the composite commodity and leisure activities are very low, the welfare gain is very 
limited (0.06%), and allowing much more flexible substitution leads to a gain of 
1.36%. Second, the labour tax reduction required to achieve the maximal possible 
welfare gain is increasing in the elasticity of substitution.  When non-commuting trips 
become more price elastic, an equal exogenous reduction in the labour tax rate has 
larger benefits in terms of reducing congestion, while tax revenues are collected to 





meet the revenue requirement.  However, the reduction in the traffic flow is smaller 
when the elasticity of substitution is larger (and labour taxes are sufficiently reduced).  
This is the result of combining a stronger reduction in non-commuting trips and a 
larger share of auto-commuting when the level of non-commuting trips is strongly 
reduced.  To the reverse, when the elasticity of substitution is low, non-commuting 
trips are only slightly reduced and labour supply is increased by encouraging bus 
commuting. 
Summing up, the effect of transport taxes on welfare, labour supply and the 
marginal value of time depend to a large extent on the price elasticity of non-
commuting transport demand.  When it is low, labour supply will be encouraged 
through manipulation of the modal split in commuting, rather than through reducing 
non-commuting trips.  The effects of such a policy on welfare and on the marginal 
value of time are limited, however. 
 
4.  Summary and conclusion 
 
The analysis suggests that transport tax reform to cope with external congestion costs 
in a second-best setting tends to increase consumers’ marginal value of time savings, 
if account is taken of the simultaneous presence of commuting and non-commuting 
trips on the road.  The fundamental reason is that the tax reform allows shifting part of 
the tax burden to relative complements to leisure, thereby increasing the opportunity 
cost of leisure.  A numerical illustration for a prototype mid-sized Belgian city 
suggests that the effect of transport tax changes on the marginal value of time is 
significant.  Effectively, marginal external congestion costs after the reform are higher 




more than compensates for the reduction in congestion costs due to lower traffic 
demand. It should be stressed that this increase is accompanied by a welfare increase. 
The effect also holds when optimal transport and labour taxes are considered. Finally, 
the increase in the value of time is smaller, but positive, when transport taxes cannot 
be differentiated across trip purposes.  
Hence, assuming constant values of time in an analysis of transport tax reform 
may produce inaccurate results whenever the traffic flow consists of commuting and 
non-commuting transport.  Traffic flows that are homogenous in terms of trip purpose 
will display a smaller sensitivity of the marginal time value to transport tax changes. 
The analysis is subject to some caveats.  First, the assumption of strict 
complementarity between peak-hour commuting trips and labour supply is restrictive.  
Relaxing it will affect the optimal values of the tax instruments and the resulting value 
of time, but the direction of the change can be expected to remain as discussed here.  
Assuming strict complementarity probably is to be preferred above treating transport 
as a standard commodity, when transport tax reform is analysed in a context of 
distortionary taxes on labour.  Second, the analysis has abstracted from distributional 
considerations.  Taking these into account may imply that alternative types of revenue 
use (e.g. increasing lump sum transfers instead of reducing labour taxes) become 
relatively more attractive.  Finally, the numerical results are exploratory.  The goal 
here is to illustrate the mechanisms at work in the theoretical analysis, using realistic 
orders of magnitude for the parameters.  More realistic policy analysis would require 
more investment in the transport data (e.g. on the cost characteristics of the public 
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This appendix outlines of the general procedure for determining the impact of price 
and tax changes on the value of time. Utility is given in general by 012 (,,,) Uq qq N 















The effect of a labour tax increase on the value of time can be written as: 
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Using the first-order conditions  0 u λ =  and  N u γ =  we have by differentiation: 
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To find the impact of the labour tax on consumption and leisure demands, substitute 
0 u λ =  and  N u γ =  into the first-order conditions for commuting and non-commuting 
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Differentiating this system yields a system of four equations in four unknowns 
012 ,,, dq dq dq dN . Solving for the unknowns allows evaluating the impact of tax and 











dt . A similar procedure holds for evaluating the effect of transport 
price changes. For an unrestrictedly general specification of preferences the results are 
not transparent, as they depend on all second derivatives of the utility function, many 
of which are difficult to sign. We therefore imposed some simplifying assumptions 
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Some matrix algebra yields the effect of an exogenous price or tax changes on non-
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Assuming declining marginal utility for commuting transport and leisure 
( 22 0, 0 NN uu << ), it is clear that the own-price effect of non-commuting transport will 
be negative as long as  0 ∆< .
12 We assume this condition to hold and return to its 
interpretation below. Labour and commuting taxes have the same effect on demand 
since they identically affect the net real wage, but the effect is ambiguous. Loosely, it 
will be positive as long as  1N u  is not too negative; it may be negative otherwise.   
In a similar fashion, the impact of tax or price changes on labour supply (equal to 
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These findings suggest that, as long as  1N u is not too negative, an increase in the 
labour or commuting tax reduces labour supply (i.e., the labour supply function is 
upward sloping), and it raises leisure demand. The cross-price effect of commuting 
demand with respect to non-commuting transport price and its impact on leisure 
demand can go either way.  For the interpretation, observe that a sufficient condition 
                                                 
12 This provides a clear interpretation for the stability condition ∆<0. It guarantees that the overall 
effect of an increase in  1 p on non-commuting transport demand, including all feedback effects of 




for the cross price effect of commuting with respect to the price of non-commuting to 













so that  1NN N uu + <0 is a sufficient condition for the price of non-commuting transport 
to reduce overall transport demand and, therefore, congestion. 
For completeness, consider the case where transport prices cannot or are not allowed 
to differ between commuting and non-commuting (i.e.,  12 p pp == ). All effects of 
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The impact of a common transport price increase is the sum of the effects of the 
labour tax and the non-commuting transport price of the price differentiation case. 
Interpretation is as before.  
Finally, we return briefly to the meaning of the condition  0 ∆< . By developing the 
relevant determinant one shows: 
{ } { } { }
{}
2
'0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
12 2
' ' ( ) '(1 ) '( )
'2 '
aN N N N N
N
ua a a F u u u u a a a u u
ua F u a
γγ
γ





'0 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 () ( 1 ) ( 2 ) aN N N N N uu u a uu a u a = ∆= − − +− + −  is the value of the 
determinant at constant congestion (a’=0). This is negative by the second-order 
                                                 




conditions of the consumer’s optimisation problem. All terms in the definition of ∆ 
are negative with the exception of the last one. Without a mild condition, therefore, it 
cannot be guaranteed that  0 ∆< and, as a consequence, that 1
1
0 dq
dp < . We assume 
throughout that this condition is satisfied. Intuitively, the condition is as a restriction 
on the size of feedback effects. To see this, note that the demand functions resulting 
from the consumer’s problem can be written in general as functions of prices, the 
lump-sum transfer S and, since the consumer treats congestion as given, the 
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Differentiating this system, taking account of the definition of  12 () ( ) aa F a qq == + , 



















If congestion were constant (a’=0), the total effect equals the partial effect. If 
congestion is not constant, the price-induced congestion changes generate feedback 
effects on demand, implying deviations between the partial and total effect. The 
denominator is plausibly positive because one expects more congestion to reduce 





∂  is 
negative and large, so that the final term in the numerator more than offsets the first 
term, which is negative. The economic intuition of this extreme situation is clear. 




reduces non-commuting transport. But assume that the price increase also implies a 
large reduction in commuting demand which itself reduces congestion, raising the 
demand for non-commuting transport again. If this latter effect is so strong as to more 
than offset the initial negative impact, the numerator of the above expression becomes  
positive and the ultimate outcome may yield a positive price effect.     
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